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Abstract
The multifaceted concept of ‘form’  plays a central tole in the linguistic work of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (1767–1835), where it is deeply entwined with aesthetic questions. H. Steinthal’s (1823–
1899) interpretation of linguistic form, however, made it the servant of psychology. The 
Formungstrieb (drive to formation) of Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–1893) challenged Steinthal’s
conception and placed a renewed emphasis on aesthetics. In this endeavour, Gabelentz drew on the 
work of such figures as August Friedrich Pott (1802–1887), Hans Conon von der Gabelentz (1807–
1874) and William Dwight Whitney (1827–1894). In this paper, we examine Gabelentz’ 
Formungstrieb and place it in its historical context.
1. Introduction
A multifaceted concept with a range of applications, ‘form’ has a long history in Western 
philosophy, with especially strong ties to aesthetic theory (see Tatarkiewicz 1973).1 In the linguistic 
work of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) and many of his followers, various notions of form 
serve a key role in conceptualising language. In Humboldt’s own writings the aesthetic dimension is
very much present but, by the middle of the nineteenth century, an alternative interpretation of 
1 I would like to thank Manfred Ringmacher, Jean-Michel Fortis and the anonymous reviewers of Language and 
Communication for their comments on this work.
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Humboldt’s linguistic form, associated chiefly with H. Steinthal (1823–1899),2 established itself – 
even if controversially – as a point of orientation in mainstream linguistic discourse. Steinthal 
rendered linguistic form the servant of psychology: it was treated as a window onto cognitive 
processes. The Formungstrieb (drive to formation)3 of Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–1893) 
represents a challenge, presented towards the end of the century, to Steinthal’s conception. Drawing 
on themes present in Humboldt and followers faithful to him in this respect, as well as arguments 
independently in circulation in contemporary linguistics, Gabelentz dismantles Steinthal’s 
psychologistic treatment of linguistic form and places a renewed emphasis on aesthetics.
In this paper, we examine Gabelentz’ Formungstrieb and its intellectual background. We begin in
section 2 below with a survey of Gabelentz’ point of departure, Humboldtian linguistic form as 
interpreted by Steinthal. We then turn in section 3 to Gabelentz’ objections to Steinthal’s views and 
show how the Formungstrieb was intended to present an alternative to them, substituting Steinthal’s
psychological explanations with aesthetic considerations. In section 4, we look at how his approach 
revived existing themes within the Humboldtian tradition. Finally, in section 5, we see how his 
arguments were informed by broader developments in the linguistics of the second half of the 
nineteenth century.
2. Material and form in language
Material and form – Stoff and Form – are the two complementary concepts that serve as the point of
departure for Gabelentz’ views on the aesthetic nature of language. The dichotomy was long present
in theorising about language, and became, in various guises, a commonplace of nineteenth-century 
linguistics (see Morpurgo Davies 1975:652-682; 1998:212-219). Expressed in various vocabularies 
and embedded in different metaphysical schemes, a recurring feature of language classifications of 
the time was a distinction between material content-bearing linguistic elements, usually identified 
with word roots, and formal elements that served only to indicate relations between content, 
prototypically represented by inflectional endings. Of all the contemporary accounts of material and
form in language, Steinthal’s was one of the most nuanced and sophisticated, and it was to this 
formulation that Gabelentz was chiefly responding. As Gabelentz himself comments: ‘Perhaps no 
one has written more, and more incisively, about material and form and formlessness of languages 
than Heinrich [sic] Steinthal’ (Mehr und schärfer hat vielleicht Keiner über Stoff und Form und 
Formlosigkeit der Sprachen geschrieben, als Heinrich Steinthal; Gabelentz 1891:321).
For Steinthal there is an overarching sense in which all of language is form, in that linguistic 
expressions are nothing but representations of thought. This perspective was intended to counter the
2 Steinthal’s given name was ‘Chajim’, but in print and in library catalogues he is variously referred to as ‘Heymann’,
‘Heinemann’ (his mother’s maiden name) and ‘Heinrich’. In his memoires (reproduced in Belke 1971:379), 
Steinthal relates how in his earliest childhood there was no state-sanctioned register of births, deaths and marriages 
for the Jewish community in his home town and, as a result, his German given name was never officially recorded 
and was altered arbitrarily. In this paper we follow Steinthal’s own practice and simply use his initial, ‘H.’
3 In this paper, English equivalents are generally used for German technical terms, with the original German provided
on the first occurrence. Gabelentz’ coinage Formungstrieb is, however, used in its original German form 
throughout, since this term and its accompanying concept are the subject matter of the paper. All translations are my
own.
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view of Karl Ferdinand Becker (1775–1849), a late exponent in the German-speaking world of the 
grammaire générale tradition (see Becker 1827), which aimed to ground grammar in logic. As 
Ringmacher (1996:139-140) observes, Becker sought to assimilate the logical categories of 
scholastic definition with their grammatical equivalents. In scholastic definition, the genus 
proxmimum or subject of the definition is identified with material in the Aristotelian sense – i.e. the 
substance of the definiendum – while the differentia specifica or the predicate of the definition is 
identified with the form – i.e. its characteristics. In Becker’s scheme the grammatical subject of a 
sentence in language was therefore taken to be its material, the thought or concept that it was about, 
and the predicate was taken to indicate the formal relation of this thought to others. Steinthal’s 
objection was to say that since language is merely a representation of thought, no linguistic 
expression can directly contain elements of a thought. Just as a stage play or a portrait are imaginary
representations of the world into which the real world does not enter materially, language can only 
reproduce the shape of thought and cannot be mixed with thought itself: ‘Language is nothing but 
form; its material, the thought, lies outside it. It is therefore pure form, since it is simply intuition, 
representation, appearance of the thought’ (Die Sprache ist nichts als Form ; ihr Stoff, der Gedanke,
liegt außer ihr. Sie ist darum reine Form, weil sie bloße Anschauung, Darstellung, Schein des 
Gedankens ist; Steinthal 1855:360). However, continues Steinthal, the traditional logical distinction 
between material and form is still valid at the level of thought, and a language can be more or less 
reliable in representing this distinction. We may therefore legitimately talk of material and form in 
language:
But we have now found the point that would be relevant if language were to have 
developed a distinction between form and material, material and formal elements. It is 
simply a matter of whether the difference between material and form in the thought 
itself as well as for the logician becomes also a distinction for language; that is, that not
all elements of the thought are intuited by the language and represented in the same 
way, but that language simultaneously intuits the difference of material and formal 
moments of thought and also represents this difference. Language would therefore 
remain purely formal, in accordance with its immutable nature, but it would be partly 
form of the mental material and partly form of the mental form.
(Steinthal 1855:361; italics above renders Sperrung in the original)4
 This is the point at which Steinthal’s conception couples onto the broader discussion of material 
and form current in nineteenth-century linguistic discourse, and the various morphologically based 
language classifications that grew out of it. Humboldt’s writings served as one of the main points of
reference in this discussion and as the chief stimulus for Steinthal’s own views. There was, 
according to Humboldt (1836:10), an ‘idea of perfection in language’ (Idee der Sprachvollendung), 
an ideal form that strove to achieve existence in reality through languages. As Trabant (chapter 8 of 
4 Original: ‘Wir haben nun aber doch schon den Punkt gefunden, auf den es ankäme, wenn die Sprache in sich einen 
Unterschied zwischen Form und Stoff, materialien und formalen Elementen, ausgebildet haben sollte. Es käme 
nämlich nur darauf an, daß der Unterschied von Stoff und Form, welcher im Gedanken, sowohl an sich, als für den 
Logiker, vorliegt, auch für die S p r a c h e  w e r d e ; d.h. daß nicht nur alle Elemente des Gedankens von der 
Sprache angeschaut und gleichmäßig dargestellt werden, sondern daß dieselbe zugleich den Unterschied der 
materialen und formalen Momente des Gedankens anschaue und auch diesen Unterschied darstelle. Die Sprache 
bliebe also ihrer unveränderlichen Natur gemäß rein formal; sie wäre aber theils Form des Gedankenstoffes, theils 
Form der Gedankenform […]’
3
2012; 1986) explains in his exposition of Humboldt’s philosophy of language, Humboldt saw 
language as the locus of the Kantian ‘faculty of imagination’ (Einbildungskraft), which in the 
process of linguistic production creates a synthesis of ‘sensuality’ (Sinnlichkeit) and ‘understanding’
(Verstand). According to Humboldt, a word in language is a combination of a physically perceptible
sound and a concept; it is produced through a synthetic process that fuses the two parts, and it is 
only through this process that each, the sound and the concept, takes on a definite shape. He sees 
inflection as exhibited by the Indo-European languages as true grammatical form, since it is only 
here that the process of synthesis is properly achieved. The inflected word combines the concept 
and its relation to the rest of the proposition – expressed by the word root and affix respectively – 
into a single package where the individual identity of the concept is preserved. This is in contrast to 
isolating structures, as in Chinese, where the concept maintains its individual identity but the 
relation finds no formal expression, and incorporating structures, as in Nahuatl, where the relation is
expressed, but only because one concept swallows up another (cf. Trabant 2012:143-147): 
The Mexican [i.e. Nahuatl] method of incorporation attests to a correct feeling for the 
formation of the sentence in that it puts the indication of the relations within the 
sentence directly onto the verb; that is, at the point at which the sentence wraps itself 
together as a single unit. In this way, this method is distinguished essentially and 
advantageously from the lack of specification in Chinese, where the verb is not even 
clearly indicated by its position, but is rather often only materially recognisable through 
its meaning. […] Sanskrit indicates each word as a constitutive part of the sentence in a 
very simple and natural way. The method of incorporation does not do this, but rather, 
wherever it cannot put everything together as one, allows indications to emerge from the
middle of the sentence, much like peaks, which show the direction in which the 
individual parts must be sought, according to their relationship to the sentence.
(Humboldt 1836:169)5
A comparable notion of synthesis appears in the process of ‘apperception’ (Apperception), a 
crucial component of Steinthal’s later psychologistic theory of language, based on the 
associationism of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841; cf. Ringmacher 1996:118-121; Bumann 
1965:63-70; Knobloch 1988:187-190; Levelt 2013:42-45). Gabelentz, too, described linguistic 
production in similar terms, as we will observe in the next section (see also McElvenny 
forthcoming:4). Further following the inspiration of Humboldt, Steinthal went on to elaborate the 
‘idea of language’ (Sprachidee), an ideal towards which languages strive. In line with Humboldt, 
the essential criterion for judging how far a language has come in realising the idea of language  is 
the formal means it employs in expressing the relations between concepts. The decisive point for 
Steinthal was whether a language possessed purely formal elements – making it a so-called ‘form-
5 Original: ‘Die mexicanische Einverleibungsmethode zeugt darin von einem richtigen Gefühle der Bildung des 
Satzes, dass sie die Bezeichnung seiner Beziehungen gerade an das Verbum anknüpft, also den Punkt, in welchem 
sich derselbe zur Einheit zusammenschlingt. Sie unterscheidet sich dadurch wesentlich und vortheilhaft von der 
chinesischen Andeutungslosigkeit, in welcher das Verbum nicht einmal sicher durch seine Stellung, sondern oft nur 
materiell an seiner Bedeutung kenntlich ist. […] Das Sanskrit bezeichnet auf ganz einfache und natürliche Weise 
jedes Wort als constitutiven Theil des Satzes. Die Einverleibungsmethode thut dies nicht, sondern lässt, wo sie nicht
Alles in Eins zusammenschlagen kann, aus dem Mittelpunkte des Satzes Kennzeichen, gleichsam wie Spitzen, 
ausgehen, die Richtungen anzeigen, in welchen die einzelnen Theile, ihrem Verhältniss zum Satze gemäss, gesucht 
werden müssen.’
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language’ (Formsprache) – or whether it merely repurposed material items to express relations – a 
‘formless language’ (formlose Sprachen; see Ringmacher 1996:129-181; Bumann 1966:103-115; 
Morpurgo Davies 1998:212-219):
No nation can completely escape the formal aspect of content, but the different, 
contrastive nature of form and of content and their opposing relation is not captured 
everywhere, and in just the same way neither is the true sense of forms. The formal 
aspect is represented as material alongside the content, that is it is represented 
formlessly, and the representation itself, the language, then becomes formless. Here the 
formal element and the content are material of equal rank, standing next to each other in
the linguistic representation – and so both are also expressed by many languages as 
linguistic material, without the formal moment being especially distinguished from the 
material moment. Such languages have therefore only material elements.
(Steinthal 1860:317; cf. 1850:72)6
The linguistic form that Steinthal seeks to capture is, however, not simply the morphologically 
realised ‘outer form’ (äußere Form), but rather also the ‘inner form’ (innere Form; see Steinthal 
1860:316-317; cf. 1850:71-72). ‘Inner form’ is a term first coined by Humboldt – and is generally 
associated with him – but, as Borsche (1989) has shown, the received interpretation of the term 
owes a great deal to Steinthal’s later use of it. For Steinthal, the inner form is the ultimate principle 
governing the structure of a language. It is a concept whose implications and consequences reach 
out into many different aspects of Steinthal’s linguistic and psychological theorising (see 
Ringmacher 1996:99-110; Bumann 1966:116-139), but here we focus narrowly on its role in 
Steinthal’s language classification. For these purposes, outer form is simply the sound that 
constitutes the perceptible component of the linguistic expression, while the inner form is – in the 
terms of Steinthal’s pyschologistic theory – the ‘intuition of the intuition’ (Anschauung der 
Anschauung), the process through which the consciousness grasps its concepts: ‘The intuition of the
intuition is the placing of the intuition into sound, the combination of the two, the inner linguistic 
form; while the sound is the outer linguistic form, and the representation belongs to the material of 
the consciousness’ (Die Anschauung der Anschauung ist die Versetzung der Anschauung in den 
Laut, die Verbindung beider, die i n n e r e  S p r a c h f o r m; während der Laut die äußere 
Sprachform ist, und die Vorstellung zu dem Stoffe des Bewußtseins gehört; Steinthal 1855:304; 
italics in the translation renders Sperrung in original). The problem for language classification lies 
in deciding whether or not the perceptible outer phenomena of a language are a sign of genuine 
inner form. The outer form alone is not a reliable indicator of the formal nature of a language: ‘The 
outer shape of the phonetic form is no indicator at all for the presence or absence of true inner form’
(Ueberhaupt ist die äußere Gestalt der Lautform kein Kennzeichen für die An- oder Abwesenheit 
wahrhafter innerer Form; Steinthal 1860:320-321). Rather, the decisive factor is whether the 
6 Original: ‘Formelles an dem Inhalte kann keinem Volke gänzlich entgangen sein; aber die verschiedene, 
entgegengesetze Natur der Form und des Inhalts und ihr gegenseitiges Verhältniß wird nicht überall erfaßt; und 
ebenso auch nicht der wahrhafte Sinn der Formen. Das Formelle wird als Stoff neben dem Inhalt, also dieser 
formlos vorgestellt; und das Vorstellen selbst, die Sprache wird dann formlos. Hier sind Formelles und Inhalt beide 
gleichberechtigter, neben einander stehender, von der Sprache zu bezeichnender Stoff – und so werden auch beide 
in gleicher Weise von vielen Sprachen als Stoff der Sprache ausgedrückt, ohne daß das formelle Moment von dem 
materiellen durch die Behandlung besonders geschieden wäre. Solche Sprachen haben folglich nur Stoffelemente.’
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speakers of the language conceive of the linguistic elements they use as purely formal or not:
If a language is formless in principle, then it does not possess a single true form. If even
only one true form were to have been represented in the mind of a nation that speaks a 
formless language, then it would not have quickly disappeared and left behind darkness 
like a lightning bolt in the dark night, but would rather ignite and produce a glow that 
would have melted the entire way of thinking of the nation into a different shape.
(Steinthal 1860:319; cf. 1850:73)7
One advantage of Steinthal’s appeal to an inner formal principle in classifying languages is that 
he can claim compatibility with agglutination theory. According to agglutination theory – first 
proposed by Franz Bopp (1791–1867) and widely accepted in one version or another by mid-
century – the inflectional elements of the Indo-European languages are historically derived from 
free-standing material roots in these languages (see Morpurgo Davies 1998:176-177). This presents 
an obvious obstacle, or at least a problem that must be resolved, for any language classification 
based strictly on outer form, since it introduces a fluidity between morphological classes. Steinthal 
(1860:279-284, 320-321) maintains absolute, immutable classes by arguing that form-languages are
distinguished from those that are formless because they have always had two classes of roots, one 
material and one formal, which are distinct in their inner forms. It is the presence of these formal 
roots that licensed the development of inflections in the Indo-European languages and others of 
similar type. In the case of the modern ‘analytic’ Indo-European languages – which through their 
loss of inflection appear to be regressing to a less formal nature – Steinthal (1855:366-367) insists 
that their independent pronouns and prepositions are also truly formal elements, since they replace 
the verb and noun inflections of the older ‘synthetic’ languages. The pronouns and prepositions are 
simply an alternative manifestation of the same inner formal principle. This is not the case for 
formless languages, which have only ever possessed material elements to express relations:
In this way there are therefore languages which represent the intuition ‘A behind B’ as 
three material elements: ‘A back B’ (or in whatever order they may place these 
elements). Such languages represent the given form as material and so are formless 
languages.
(Steinthal 1855:366; cf. 1860:317-318; italics renders Sperrung in original)8
3. The Formungstrieb
Gabelentz does not deny the distinction between material and form in language, but he does seek to 
dissolve Steinthal’s absolute dichotomy. He prefers to see differences of degree in form across the 
7 Original: ‘Ist eine Sprache dem Principe nach formlos, so besitzt sie auch keine einzige wahre Form. Wäre nur eine 
wahre Form in dem Geiste eines Volkes, welches eine formlose Sprache spricht, vorgestellt worden, sie würde nicht
wie ein Blitz in finsterer Nacht schnell vorübergegangen sein und dichte Finsterniß zurückgelassen haben; sie 
würde vielmehr gezündet und eine Gluth erzeugt haben, welche die ganze Denkweise des Volkes umgeschmolzen 
hätte.’
8 Original: ‘So giebt es also Sprachen, welche die Anschauung “A hinter B” als drei Stoffelemente darstellen: “A 
Rücken B”, oder in welcher Ordnung sie nun diese Elemente aufstellen mögen. Solche Sprachen stellen die 
gegebene Form als Stoff dar, und sind also f o r m l o s e  S p r a c h e n.’
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world’s languages, all created by the Formungstrieb: ‘For my part, I see everywhere here 
differences of degree, more or less lively manifestations of the drive to formation, not actual 
opposites that would justify me denying the presence of inner or outer form in a language’ (Ich 
meinerseits sehe hier überall Gradunterschiede, mehr oder minder lebhafte Äusserungen des 
Formungstriebes, nicht eigentliche Gegensätze, die mich berechtigten einer Sprache die innere 
oder äussere Form abzusprechen; Gabelentz 1891:326).9 He takes on Steinthal’s parameters – 
material and form, with the subdivision of inner and outer form – and proceeds to problematise 
them. The aesthetically motivated Formungstrieb is what emerges from the remains.
‘What does its [language’s] material consist in?’ asks Gabelentz (1891:316). ‘The answer 
presents itself immediately: in everything that arouses human thought’ (Worin besteht deren Stoff? 
Die Antwort giebt sich von selbst: in Allem was des Menschen Denken erregt). Although he does 
not delve too deeply into psychological subtleties, Gabelentz broadly follows Steinthal’s Herbartian 
approach. In Gabelentz’ scheme, the thought as ‘complete representation’ (Gesammtvorstellung) is 
analysed into parts, ‘individual representations’ (Einzelvorstellungen). The individual 
representations are then combined synthetically and, through this process, the relations between the 
material individual representations are recognised and represented in language. Initially these 
relations are simply additional material but, when they are ‘applied properly’, they are no longer 
perceived to be material, but form:
More or less sharply, [the mental eye] recognises and distinguishes the relations of the 
material individual representation among one another […] And depending on the mass 
and direction in which this occurs, such categories also push towards linguistic 
representation. Inasmuch as this is the case, these are, as a rule, at first not forms for the 
language-creating mind, but rather material to be formed. […] Material elements are 
also the binding agent, the lime and cement; but they are also, when they are applied 
properly, no longer felt to be material, but rather only binding, forming forces.
(Gabelentz 1891:317-318)10
The further distinction between inner and outer form Gabelentz (1891:319) then resolves with a 
similarly straightforward and uncomplicated definition: inner form refers to the categories that 
receive special linguistic expression, while outer form is the means used to achieve this expression. 
At this point, Gabelentz (1891:319-327) embarks on an extended survey of the various uses made of
the terms ‘inner form’ and ‘outer form’ by his predecessors – citing Steinthal, Humboldt, August 
Friedrich Pott (1802–1887) and, to a lesser extent, Friedrich Müller (1834–1898) – which leaves the
9 The first attestation of the term Formungstrieb in the published record is in Gabelentz’ definitive statement on 
linguistic form, his 1889 article ‘Material and Form in Language’ (Stoff und Form in der Sprache), a preliminary 
version of a section of his magnum opus, Die Sprachwissenschaft (Gabelentz 1891:316-348). There is a second 
edition of Die Sprachwissenschaft, from 1901, which contains substantive additions made after Gabelentz’ death by
Albrecht Graf von der Schulenburg (1865–1902), Gabelentz’ nephew and pupil. Here we cite the Formungstrieb 
text as it appears in the 1891 first edition of Die Sprachwissenschaft, since it represents the last version of the text 
to be penned and approved by Gabelentz himself.
10 Original: ‘Mit mehr or minderer Schärfe erkennt und unterscheidet [das geistige Auge] auch die Beziehungen der 
materiellen Einzelvorstellungen untereinander […] Und je nach dem Masse und der Richtung, in der dies geschieht,
drängen auch solche Kategorien zur sprachlichen Darstellung. Insoweit sind auch sie in der Regel für den 
sprachschaffenden Geist zunächst nicht Formen, sondern zu formender Stoff. […] Stoffe sind ja auch die 
Bindemittel, auch Leim und Kitt; sie aber werden, wenn sie richting angewandt sind, nicht mehr als Stoff, sondern 
nur als bindende, formende Kräfte empfunden.’
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impression of a rather chaotic theoretical landscape. As Gabelentz (1891:327) comments, he doubts 
‘whether much clarity on the matter has been achieved through [the survey]. A lot of what has been 
been repeated here concerns the outer form, and all of it is aimed at the evaluation of languages 
[…]’ ([…] ob die Sache dadurch sehr an Klarheit gewonnen [hat]. Vieles des hier Wiedergegebenen
betrifft schon die äussere Form, Alles zweckt auf die Werthabschätzung der Sprachen ab […]). The 
principal failing of his predecessors, reflected in the survey, was to rely too heavily on a superficial 
assessment of the perceptible manifestations presented in the outer form of languages: ‘We see,’ 
comments Gabelentz (1891:320) in his discussion of Humboldt’s position on inner form, ‘how 
everywhere here the outer form, the morphology, is in the foreground, but behind it the inner need 
of formation is sought’ (Man sieht, wie hier überall die äussere Form, die Morphologie im 
Vordergrunde steht, dahinter aber doch das innere Bedürfniss der Formung gesucht wird).
Outer form alone is not a reliable indicator of the inner formal nature of languages – this is, as 
we saw in the previous section, also Steinthal’s position. According to Steinthal, to decide if a 
linguistic element is purely formal we must know if it is treated formally in the mind of the speaker,
without any traces of material content. By contrast, Gabelentz argues – using an example that 
answers to Steinthal’s ‘A back B’ above – that once a linguistic expression has been used to express 
a relation, it makes a sudden and irrevocable transition to being formal:
If a material word is even once taken into service as an expression of relation through 
generalisation of its meaning, then transition has taken place in the soul: the more 
general meaning is from then on the predominant meaning. This change may occur 
rather quickly and yet of course unnoticed. And when, for example, the parents still 
spoke metaphorically of the belly of a house, as in the belly of a person, then by the 
same words the children might think of the inside of a person and the inside of a house, 
and from here the way to being a true formal preposition or postposition is not far.
(Gabelentz 1891:318; cf. ibid.:384)11
Despite their best intentions, Gabelentz’ predecessors unjustifiably afforded the outer phenomena
of inflectional morphology a special status in assessing the crucial property of inner form (cf. 
Gabelentz 2011[1879]:357-359). Even Steinthal must answer this charge: as we saw in the previous 
section, he treated the inflectional endings attested in the classical Indo-European languages as 
decisive proof of the eternal formal nature of the family, including its modern analytic offspring. 12 
Gabelentz (1891:250-253), by contrast, denies in his discussion of language history the exclusive 
status of any special formal apparatus in specific language families. He envisages a ‘spiral course of
language history’ (Spirallauf der Sprachgeschichte; ibid.:250), where all languages follow a 
spiralling path through analytic to synthetic structures and back again. Modern Chinese, for 
example, is tending towards agglutination, while its parent, the strongly isolating Classical Chinese,
11 Original: ‘Ist einmal das Stoffwort durch Verallgemeinerung seiner Bedeutung als Beziehungsausdruck in Dienst 
genommen worden, so hat sich auch in der Seele ein Umschlag vollzogen: die allgemeinere Bedeutung ist hinfort 
die vorwiegende. Dieser Wechsel mag ziemlich schnell und doch natürlich unvermerkt geschehen. Und wenn z.B. 
die Eltern nocht bildlich vom Bauche des Hauses sprachen, wie vom Bauche des Menschen, so mögen die Kinder 
sich unter denselben Worten das Innere des Menschen und das Innere des Hauses denken, und von da an ist der 
Weg zur wahrhaft formalen Prä- oder Postposition nicht mehr weit.’
12 Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) later dimissed Steinthal’s distinction with a similar argument (Wundt 1900:552-554; 
cf. Levelt 2013:189). Wundt does not cite Gabelentz or any other predecessors for this argument.
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shows traces of an older agglutinative, perhaps even inflecting stage (ibid.:252).
Having dismissed the possibility of linguistic form as the simple representation of underlying 
thought, Gabelentz asks why our ancestors would have invented such seemingly superfluous 
devices as grammatical gender, congruence, conjugations and declensions, and why we maintain 
these to a greater or lesser extent in our languages today. He rules out an explanation in terms of the
needs of communication alone (Gabelentz 1891:343; cf. Gabelentz 2011[1879]:388-389): ‘But 
many languages – if we take them by word and letter – say much more than is necessary for 
understanding, certainly also more than the speaker thought and intended’ (Und doch sagen viele 
Sprachen, wenn man sie beim Worte und beim Buchstaben nimmt, weit mehr, als zur Verständigung 
nöthig ist, gewiss auch mehr, als der Redner gedacht und beabsichtigt hat). Even grammatical 
devices that may seem more pragmatically motivated exceed the needs of communication. Here 
Gabelentz (ibid.:346) lists such examples as voice alternations, the distinction between predicative 
and attributive constructions, conjunctions and other means for combining clauses to form periods, 
and the more or less rigid rules of syntax and the eccentricities they permit in various languages. 
The source of all these devices, argues Gabelentz (ibid.:347), lies in our aesthetic drives. Grammar 
is a luxury (Luxus) that we grant ourselves; it emerges from the Formungstrieb, the drive we have 
to shape our speech as we please, according to our whims and fancies, rather than just providing a 
flat, objective description of the world. The Formungstrieb is simply part of the more general ‘play-
drive’ (Spieltrieb), explains Gabelentz, using Friedrich Schiller’s (1759–1805; 1960[1795]) term for
the general aesthetic drive to which he attributed all artistic efforts:
It is just a higher level of the play-drive, that joy at free, artistic formation, that in fresh 
fancy puts the stamp of its own individuality and mood on every creation. Even when 
the artistic achievement was still slight, that little surplus of effort that I made on my 
work over and above bare utility was already a piece of love, and gave the dead material
a breath of the personal for all time. And precisely the same thing happened with 
language. The soul demands something more than that simple business-like style that 
says in objective clarity all that is necessary and nothing more. It wants to identify itself 
with the thing, how it relates to its world, temperamentally, fancifully, moodily. I repeat 
the expression from earlier: it wants not only to express something but also itself, and 
wants not only to more securely compel the listener to share a thought, but also share a 
feeling. Here it conducts its business to the full – it is indeed so rich that it adds some of
its own ingredient even to the smallest bit, at first according to the inspiration of the 
moment, apparently without rule but always meaningfully; then as time progresses ever 
more under the force of habitual norms.
(Gabelentz 1891:344)13
13 Original: ‘Es ist doch nur eine höhere Stufe des Spieltriebes, jenes Gefallen an freier, künstlerischer Formung, das 
in frischer Laune jeder Schöpfung den Stempel der eigenen Individualität und Stimmung aufdrücken muss. Es sei 
die künstlerische Leistung noch so gering: schon jener Überschuss von Arbeit, die ich meinem Werke über den 
blossen Nützlichkeitsbedarf hinaus zugewendet habe, ist ein Stück Liebe gewesen und hat dem todten Stoffe für 
alle Zeiten einen Hauch des Persönlichen gegeben. Und ebenso geschah es mit der Sprache. Die Seele verlangte ein
Mehreres als jenen Geschäftsstil, der in objectiver Klarheit alles Nothwendige sagt und weiter nichts. Sie will in der
Sache sich selbst wiederfinden, wie sie sich ihrer Welt gegenüber gemüthvoll, phantastisch, launenhaft verhält, will,
– dass ich den Ausdruck wiederhole, – nicht nur etwas, sondern auch sich selbst aussprechen, und wird um so 
sicherer den Hörer nicht nur zum Mitdenken, sondern auch zum Mitfühlen zwingen. Da wirthschaftet sie aus dem 
Vollen, – sie ist ja so reich; da wird auch dem Kleinsten etwas von eigener Zuthat angeheftet, erst nach der 
Eingebung des Augenblickes, scheinbar regellos und doch immer bedeutsam; dann je länger je mehr unter dem 
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The Formungstrieb is an essential part of human language, and all languages, to a greater or 
lesser extent, will show signs of its operation. Correctly judging the inner formal nature of a 
language requires a knowledge of how to productively use it equivalent to that of a native speaker. 
In the terms of Gabelentz’ theory of grammar-writing (see McElvenny forthcoming:2-7), we need a 
Synonymik, an account of the fine distinctions in sense between expressions in a language that are 
otherwise propositionally synonymous: 
From the outset we must recognise this drive in every human language. […] The drive 
manifests itself differently in its degree and direction, and in this way only the deepest 
knowledge of the language can judge it justly. An exhaustive Synonymik, lexical as well 
as grammatical, would necessarily lead to knowledge of where and how much the 
language-forming spirit actuates the urge for subjective shaping of the world.
(Gabelentz 1891:347)14
Grammar is the residue of the formal choices that have previously been made in the language, by
our ancestors and by us. In the earliest stages of language everything would have proceeded ‘in 
gypsy-like freedom according to the inspiration of the moment’ ([…]  in zigeunerischer Freiheit 
nach der Eingebung des Augenblickes; Gabelentz 1891:363), where only a few incipient 
grammatical categories had a stable form (ibid.:363-365). But this initial freedom inevitably became
constrained by the need for predictability in communicative intercourse and through simple habit, 
the product of mental and behavioural inertia:
In this way limits of the usual, pleasing, allowed will have been set to natural 
arbitrariness early in the use of language. Special customs formed in every language 
community, and if human language was originally one, then the evidence of this unity 
will have been cleared away very quickly.
(Gabelentz 1891:371)15
In language there is a progression along the continuum ‘possibility – rule – law’ (Möglichkeit – 
Regel – Gesetz), as Gabelentz (1891:370) entitled the concluding section of his discussion on form. 
What begins as just one among many possible means of expression chosen by a speaker becomes, 
through repeated use, the rule or standard form of expression, and then finally a law stipulating the 
required and only permissible form. This restriction can then be broken, leading to innovation in the
grammar, but at this point the novel expression is no longer a free choice from among numerous 
possibilities, but rather an act of liberation from the law. Our free, artistic drive to shape our speech 
according to our moods and desires is therefore gradually weighed down and restrained by the 
Zwange gewohnheitsmässiger Normen.’
14 Original: ‘Diesen Trieb müssen wir wohl von vornherein jeder menschlichen Sprache zuerkennen. […] Nach Mass 
und Richtung äussert der Trieb sich verschieden, und insoweit vermag nur die eingehendste Sprachkenntniss ihn 
gerecht zu beurtheilen. Eine erschöpfende Synonymik, sowohl eine lexikalische wie eine grammatische, müsste zu 
der Erknenntniss führen, inwieweit und wo der sprachbildende Geist den Drang nach subjectiver Gestaltung der 
Welt bethätigt.’
15 Original: ‘So mochten denn auch der naturwüchsigen Willkür in der Behandlung der Sprache frühe schon 
Schranken des Üblichen, Gefälligen, Erlaubten gesetzt werden. In jeder Sprachgemeinde bildeten sich besondere 
Bräuche; und wenn alle menschliche Sprache ursprünglich eine war, so mochten sich die Spuren dieser Einheit 
recht schnell verwischen.’
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accumulated mass of past expressions. In order to be understood and out of sheer mental inertia we 
generally bear this weight. But on occasion we may push it aside, breaking the rules of grammar 
and renewing the linguistic system.
Steinthal of course recognised diversity in inner linguistic form across the world’s languages; 
this is one aspect of the relativism inherent in the Völkerpsychologie of Steinthal and his colleague 
Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903) that leads Kalmar (1987) to cast them as forerunners of Boasian 
cultural pluralism. For Steinthal, the inner linguistic form of each language represents a different 
subjective world:
Instinctive consciousness is therefore instinctive freedom, is subjectivity – that is, a 
subjective conception of the objective – and this grants the possibility of the greatest 
diversity in its product, the inner linguistic form. It will sometimes possess certain 
forms, sometimes not, sometimes such forms and sometimes other forms.
(Steinthal 1855:378)16
However, even though Steinthal recognises this diversity in inner linguistic form, he still 
perceives a fundamental, unbridgeable gulf between those languages with true formal elements and 
those without. While Gabelentz sees form developing gradually everywhere through individual 
expressive choices, Steinthal relegates consideration of expressive possibilities to the separate field 
of stylistics: ‘While grammar treats language as material, the object of stylistics is the form that is 
given to language in order to represent a certain content in a certain form’ (Während die Grammatik
die Sprache als Stoff behandelt, ist der Gegenstand der Styllehre die Form, welche der Sprache 
gegeben wird, um einen bestimmten Inhalt in bestimmter Form darzustellen; Steinthal 1866:474, 
478). That is, grammar studies the properties of a language as a material to be shaped into a 
particular representation, while stylistics studies the many ways in which the material can be 
shaped. Here Steinthal (ibid.:474) uses the analogy of a marble statue. Language as material is like 
the marble block from which the statue is made. The form is the shape imposed on the marble block
by the sculptor, which reproduces the form of the subject that the statue represents. In language, 
there is a multitude of possible representations of any content and the ‘speaking artist’ (redender 
Künstler) has a free choice from among them: ‘The same content permits many different 
representations – [the speaking artist] will decide which he will realise’ (Derselbe Inhalt läßt 
mannichfache Darstellungen zu, – [der redende Künstler] wird bestimmen, welche er ausführen 
will; Steinthal ibid.:478). 
The sense of ‘form’ Steinthal has in mind in his discussion of stylistics is the one in which all of 
language is form because it is nothing but representation. The sense targeted by Gabelentz, that in 
which some languages have special formal elements dedicated to representing the formal 
components of thought, is quarantined by Steinthal from these stylistic questions (see Steinthal 
1855:139-140; cf. Ringmacher 1996:144-145). Gabelentz’ critique breaks down this separation and 
introduces a continuum between grammar and style (cf. Gabelentz 1891:108-111). While Steinthal 
treats language structure as the material to be shaped into a representation of thought, which can be 
16 Original: ‘Das instinctive Selbstbewusstsein ist also instinctive Freiheit, ist Subjectivität, d.h. eine subjective 
Auffassung des Objectiven; und somit ist die Möglichkeit zu der größten Verschiedenheit ihres Erzeugnisses, der 
innern Sprachform, gegeben. Diese wird bald gewisse Formen besitzen, bald nicht, bald solche und bald andere.’
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more or less suited to the task through the presence or absence of dedicated formal elements, 
Gabelentz sees language structure simply as solidified style.
4. Aesthetic elements in the Humboldtian tradition
In an opening footnote in his definitive statement on linguistic form, the article ‘Stoff und Form in 
der Sprache’, Gabelentz (1889:185) promises that his ‘views deviate significantly from those of 
[his] great predecessors and contemporaries’ (Anschauungen aber weichen von denen 
hervorragender Vorgänger und Zeitgenossen erheblich ab). While Gabelentz’ position is most 
certainly unique, it cannot be considered novel. It is perhaps best seen as the recalibration of factors.
The aesthetic aspect of language was already prominent in the work of Humboldt and many of his 
followers, and was merely compartmentalised by Steinthal. Seen from this perspective, Gabelentz is
simply placing renewed emphasis on aesthetics in determining formal structures. 
A recurring motif in Humboldt’s conception of language is its primary role as a medium of free 
self-expression (see, e.g., Humboldt 1836:59-60), and from this perspective Humboldt explicitly 
drew parallels between language and art. For Humboldt, the synthetic process that combines sound 
and concept to produce a linguistic expression – the process which, as we noted in section 2, 
underlies his notion of linguistic form – is comparable to the activity of an artist imposing the image
they wish to create on physical material: ‘In general language often reminds us of art, but it does so 
at most here, in the deepest and most inexplicable part of its process. The sculptor and painter also 
weds the idea to the material […]’ (Überhaupt erinnert die Sprache oft, aber am meisten hier, in 
dem tiefsten und unerklärbarsten Theile ihres Verfahrens, an die Kunst. Auch der Bildner und 
Maler vermählt die Idee mit dem Stoff […]; Humboldt 1836:103). Steinthal, as we saw in the 
previous section, placed the individual, creative aspect of this process under the rubric of 
representation, which he considered separately from the structure of languages. Humboldt, however,
made no such distinction. As Schmitter (1982) argues, there is good reason to believe that 
Humboldt was not simply indulging in a superficial analogy: along with other parallels, Humboldt’s
description of the synthetic process behind linguistic form recapitulates in both its contours and 
details earlier statements on artistic form in his specifically aesthetic writings. In this connection, 
we might also observe that one name Humboldt uses to refer to a force that drives the formation of 
the outer phonetic form (Lautform) that participates in the synthetic process is the Bildungstrieb, a 
term that shares an obvious likeness to Gabelentz’ Formungstrieb.17 The Bildungstrieb can be more 
or less strong in a language, leading to a corresponding level of development in the linguistic form:
The firm connection of the two main constitutive parts of language [the phonetic form 
and the inner linguistic rules] manifests itself primarily in sensual and imaginative life 
that in this way bloom in language, while a one-sided dominance of understanding, 
dryness and soberness are the unfailing consequences if a language is intellectually 
expanded and refined in a period in which the Bildungstrieb of the sounds no longer has
the necessary strength, or the forces have operated in a one-sided way from the 
17 Humboldt’s Bildungstrieb is most likely inspired by the Bildungstrieb of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–
1840; 1791[1781]), the vitalistic force believed to drive the formation of living organisms. As an undergraduate, 
Humboldt attended some of Blumenbach’s lectures in Göttingen (see Quillien 2015:67-68).
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beginning. Specifically, we see this in those languages in which some tenses are formed 
only with separate auxiliary verbs, such as in Arabic; that is, where the idea of such 
forms is no longer effectively accompanied by the drive of sound formation.
(Humboldt 1836:102-103)18
Humboldt also maintains the view that languages simultaneously provide a store of means 
individual speakers can use to express themselves creatively while at the same time placing 
constraints on their possibilities of expression. This represents in essence the same tension between 
innovation and inertia posited by Gabelentz.
By a word no one thinks of exactly the same thing as another person, and this still tiny 
difference ripples, like a circle in water, throughout the whole language. All 
understanding is therefore at the same time a not-understanding, all agreement in 
thought and feeling at the same time a divergence. In the way in which language is 
modified in each individual it reveals a power the individual has over it, which works 
against the force described above that it exercises over him. We can view its force (if we
wish to use the expression of mental force) as a physiological effect; the power that 
comes from the individual is one that is purely dynamic. In the influence that language 
has on the individual lie the laws of language and its forms, in the reaction that comes 
from the individual a principle of freedom.
(Humboldt 1836:64-65; italics renders Sperrung in original)19
This underlying aesthetic current within Humboldt’s writings was maintained in various guises 
by several of his followers. Perhaps most significant for the influence they had on Gabelentz are 
August Friedrich Pott and Gabelentz’ own father, Hans Conon von der Gabelentz (1807–1874), 
both figures whom Gabelentz held in high regard (see, e.g., Gabelentz 1886; 1888). While Pott 
endorsed Steinthal’s embrace of the empirical comparison of languages in opposition to the a priori
theorising of the grammaire générale tradition, he felt that Steinthal still brought too many 
preconceptions to the task. In Pott’s (1863) critique of Steinthal (1860), we can recongise key 
elements of Gabelentz’ later position. Language, according to Pott, serves a multitude of purposes, 
and the apparent synonymy that we encounter in language is actually the reflection of the fine 
distinctions in the numerous dimensions of linguistic expression:
Language has the task of stimulating us mentally to special feelings, representations, 
18 Original: ‘Die feste Verbindung der beiden constitutiven Haupttheile der Sprache [der ‘Lautform’ und der ‘inneren 
Sprachgesetze’] äußert sich vorzüglich in dem sinnlichen und phantasiereichen Leben, das ihr dadurch aufblüht, da 
hingegen einseitige Verstandesherschaft, Trockenheit und Nüchternheit die unfehlbaren Folgen sind, wenn sich die 
Sprache in einer Epoche intellectueller erweitert und verfeinert, wo der Bildungstrieb der Laute nicht mehr die 
erforderliche Stärke besitzt, oder wo gleich anfangs die Kräfte einseitig gewirkt haben. Im Einzelnen sieht man dies
an den Sprachen, in denen einige Tempora wie im Arabischen, nur durch getrennte Hülfsverba gebildet werden, wo 
also die Idee solcher Formen nicht mehr wirksam von dem Triebe der Lautformung begleitet gewesen ist.’
19 Original: ‘Keiner denkt bei dem Wort gerade und genau das, was der andre, und die noch so kleine Verschiedenheit 
zittert, wie ein Kreis im Wasser, durch die ganze Sprache fort. Alles Verstehen ist daher immer zugleich ein Nicht-
Verstehen, alle Übereinstimmung in Gedanken und Gefühlen zugleich ein Auseinandergehen. In der Art, wie sich 
die Sprache in jedem Individuum modificirt, offenbart sich, ihrer im Vorigen dargestellten M a c h t gegenüber, eine
Gewalt des Menschen über sie. Ihre Macht kann man (wenn man den Ausdruck auf geistige Kraft anwenden will) 
als ein physiologisches Wirken ansehen; die von ihm ausgehende Gewalt ist ein rein dynamisches. In dem auf ihn 
ausgeübten Einfluß liegt die G e s e t z m ä ß i g k e i t der Sprache und ihrer Formen, in der aus ihm kommenden 
Rückwirkung ein Princip der Freiheit.’
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and to the formation of certain concepts and judgements. But the kind of stimulation is 
very diverse, depending on logical, ethical or aesthetic, rhetorical, poetic and other 
needs. This is the reason why there is not only an advantage in having synonymous 
expressions that are nearly identical and yet have different effects especially for 
feelings, but also the reason why it is necessary to have a store of turns of phrase and 
phraseological manners of speaking for essentially the same thing that is not too limited.
(Pott 1863:193; italics renders Sperrung in original)20
This account of synonymy Pott illustrates largely with lexical examples, but its applicability to 
more strictly grammatical aspects of language is apparent, and Gabelentz’ (1891:347) later plea for 
an ‘exhaustive Synonymik, lexical as well as grammatical,’ as the best means to capturing the formal
nature of a language  – which we examined in the previous section – provides further evidence of 
the kinship between these corresponding positions of Pott and Gabelentz. 
Like Gabelentz later, Pott (1863:231-237) recognises the distinction between material and form 
in language, but rejects Steinthal’s absolute dichotomy. Comparing the Indo-European and Ural-
Altaic languages from a historical perspective, he sees no basis for claiming the presence of original
formal elements in the former family while denying them in the latter. Looking at Chinese and the 
typologically similar Thai and Burmese, Pott questions Steinthal’s impartiality in applying his 
formal measure. Steinthal, alleges Pott, seeks out specific grammatical properties of Chinese to 
bring it into the fold of form-languages, even though morphologically it is on a par with Thai and 
Burmese. It would seem that Steinthal could not bear to consign Chinese, a language of a great 
civilisation and literature, to the formless category. In his private notebook, Gabelentz 
(2011[1879]:358-359) later makes the same point (see McElvenny forthcoming:12).
The role of his father, Hans Conon von der Gabelentz, in shaping Gabelentz’ approach to 
language is reinforced by a subtle but recurring textual link between the two. In his theoretical 
expositions, Gabelentz (1869:377; 1875:160-161; 1891:102; cf. ibid.:109) repeatedly invokes the 
saying le style, c’est l’homme as a folk affirmation of the point that the style of expression casts 
light on how the world is conceptualised in each language and by each individual.21 Hans Conon 
employs the phrase in the same connection, as in his 1861 essay ‘On the passive’ (Über das 
Passivum), a typological investigation, on the model of Humboldt’s (1830[1827]) ‘On the dual’ 
(Über den Dualis), of the expression of passive voice across a diverse selection of the world’s 
languages:
If we want to achieve clear understanding about any phenomenon in language, then we 
20 Original: ‘Die Sprache hat die Aufgabe, uns geistig a n z u r e g e n zu besonderen Gefühlen, Vorstellungen und zu 
Bildung bestimmter Begriffe und Urtheile. Die A r t ihrer Anregung aber muß, je nach dem l o g i s c h e n, e t h i s 
c h e n oder ä s t h e t i s c h e n, r h e t h o r i s c h e n, p o e t i s c h e n und anderweiten Bedürfniß, sehr m a n n i c
h f a l t i g seyn. Daher nicht nur der Vortheil nahezu auf eins hinauslaufender und doch besonders für das Gefühl 
oft so überaus v e r s c h i e d e n wirksamer s y n o n y m e r Einzelausdrücke, sondern auch die Nothwendigkeit 
eines nicht zu knappen Vorrathes von Wendungen und phraseologischer Redeweisen für wesentlich D a s s e l b e.’
21 The saying is of course generally attributed to Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1707–1788), in his address upon 
induction into the French Academy in 1753. What Gabelentz repeats is a folk misquotation; Buffon 
(1872[1753]:24) in fact said: Ces choses sont hors de l’homme, le style est l’homme même. The original quotation 
represents the climax of Buffon’s avowal of the importance of style and expression in capturing scientific truths; 
only knowledge that is elegantly expressed will be passed on, he argued.
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have to examine the concept and the nature of language itself. Language, as the 
expression of human thought through articulated sounds, is the product of a necessity 
grounded in the mental nature of man. Just as breathing is a requirement of animal life, 
language is a requirement of mental life. But while animal life is the same for all 
humans and therefore the process of breathing is the same everywhere, the infinite 
diversity of the human mind causes a similar diversity of language, so that not only 
every group of people speaks its own language, but in reality every person does, and the
phrase le style, c’est l’homme has its justification and profound meaning.
(H.C. Gabelentz 1861:451-452; italics added)22
We can be certain that this is not just a superficial similarity in phraseology between father and 
son. Gabelentz (1891:462) counted his father’s essay on the passive among the best examples of 
typological research (cf. McElvenny forthcoming:13), and Schulenburg (Gabelentz 1901:327) paid 
homage to the role of the father when he added, as a kind of motto, a quotation from the essay to the
beginning of Gabelentz’ discussion of inner form: language is ‘[…] not the expression of what is to 
be represented, but rather of the one who is representing; language, in the shape it shows itself to us,
is not to be treated objectively, but subjectively’  ([…] nicht Ausdruck des Darzustellenden, sondern
des Darstellenden, sie ist in der Gestalt, in welcher sie sich uns zeigt, nicht objectiv, sondern 
subjectiv zu fassen; H.C. Gabelentz 1861:452-453).
An appeal to individual aesthetic considerations in accounting for linguistic structure was 
therefore already very much an established part of the Humboldtian tradition as it came down to 
Gabelentz. This aspect was simply able to resurface in his writings as he broke down the fixed 
psychological scheme of Steinthal’s linguistic typology. 
5. Contemporary arguments against material and form
Gabelentz also drew inspiration from outside the Humboldtian tradition: in particular, the arguments
he deployed against Steinthal’s division of material and form in language were more or less already 
present in broader contemporary linguistic discourse. By Gabelentz’ time, there was a general 
movement, directed against the rampant psychologism of Steinthal, among other views, which saw 
language as a social institution, as a product of chance shaped by the functional-pragmatic needs of 
its speakers. A prominent leader of this new direction, and an unashamed polemicist whose targets 
included Steinthal, Humboldt, and August Schleicher (1821–1868) was William Dwight Whitney 
22 Original: ‘Wenn wir irgend eine Erscheinung in der Sprache uns zu klarem Verständniss bringen wollen, müssen 
wir auf den Begriff und das Wesen der Sprache selbst zurück gehen. Die Sprache, als der Ausdruck des 
menschlichen Denkens durch articulirte Laute, ist das Product einer in der geistigen Natur des Menschen 
begründeten Nothwendigkeit. So wie das Athmen dem thierischen Leben, so ist die Sprache dem geistigen Leben 
Bedürfniss. Während aber das animalische Leben bei allen Menschen gleichmässig und darum auch der 
Athmungsprocess überall derselbe ist, so bedingt die unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit des menschlichen Geistes eine 
gleiche Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprache, so dass nicht nur jeder Volksstamm, sondern in Wahrheit jeder Mensch seine 
eigene Sprache redet, und das: le style c'est l'homme seine Berechtigung und tiefere Bedeutung erhält.’ The analogy
between the physiology of breathing and the expression of thought through language is a recurring motif in the 
Humboldtian tradition. Steinthal (1867:viii) and Gabelentz (2013[1881]:26) both employ versions of this analogy. 
Pott (1863:218-219) enumerates several other physiological analogies in his critique of the morphological 
comparison offered by Steinthal (1860).
15
(1827–1894; see Nerlich 1990). We can be sure that Gabelentz knew at least the key writings of 
Whitney: quite apart from his high profile in the contemporary international linguistics community, 
Whitney’s (1875) introduction to general linguistics The Life and Growth of Language is cited by 
Gabelentz (1891:145) as an example of an outline of the general principles of language history, 
alongside Hermann Paul’s (1846–1921;1880) Principien der Sprachgeschichte.
The theoretical foundation that underlies Whitney’s critique is his common-sense view of 
language as a human institution as opposed to the more ‘metaphysical’ views of language as the 
emanation of the psyche, or even as a natural organism. In a vein traced again by Gabelentz, 
Whitney argues that languages develop in the way they do simply because grammar is the 
accumulation of choices that speakers have made in concrete communicative situations: ‘[…] 
language is what its speakers make it: its structure, of whatever character, represents their collective
capacity in that particular direction of effort. It is, not less than every other part of their civilization, 
the work of the race ; every generation, every individual, has borne a part in shaping it’ (Whitney 
1875:224). This is a position adopted also by several of Whitney’s contemporaries, such as Michel 
Bréal (1832–1915), Johan Nicolai Madvig (1804–1886) and Philipp Wegener (1848–1916), and 
which became something of an orthodoxy towards the end of the century, as it was incorporated 
into Neogrammarian doctrine (see Nerlich 1990). Although, as we saw in section 3, Gabelentz 
dismissed communicative needs as the principal factor driving the development of elaborate formal 
devices, he did not deny the obvious role of language in communication. This is particularly 
pronounced in passages of Die Sprachwissenschaft that deal with historical language change:
Generally language serves intercourse; that is, two parties, between whom it should 
mediate, the ‘me’ and the ‘you’. It is therefore independent of both parties: I have to 
speak so that you understand me, otherwise my speech fails in its purpose. In other 
words: your language must also be mine, I have to speak approximately the same way 
as you are used to speaking and hearing spoken. This habit is based on tradition, we are 
both bound to this tradition.
(Gabelentz 1891:191)23
In this connection Gabelentz (1891:191-195) set up an opposition between two competing 
drives, towards ‘comfort’ and towards ‘clearness’ (Bequemlichkeits- and Deutlichkeitstrieb), that 
motivate linguistic change. These drives operate on all levels of language – phonetically, where 
indistinct articulation represents comfort for the speaker and drives phonetic attrition, which is 
counterbalanced by emphatic articulation for clearness; to grammar, where, for example, comfort 
led to the loss of inflection in the lingua rustica, and clearness elaborated new grammatical means 
in the modern Romance languages.24 But even the concession to ‘comfort’ and ‘clearness’ is not 
maintained on an exclusively functional-pragmatic plane by Gabelentz. ‘Clearness’, in an extended 
23 Original: ‘Regelmässig dient die Sprache dem Verkehre, das heisst zweien Parteien, zwischen denen sie vermitteln 
soll, dem Ich und dem Du. Darum ist sie von beiden Parteien abhängig: ich muss so reden, dass Du es verstehst, 
sonst verfehlt meine Rede ihren Zweck. Mit anderen Worten: Deine Sprache muss auch die meine sein, ich muss 
annähernd so reden, wie Du zu reden und reden zu hören gewohnt bist. Diese Gewöhnung beruht auf 
Überlieferung, an diese Überlieferung sind wir beide gebunden.’
24 The details of Gabelentz’ drives to comfort and clearness are no doubt original, but his notion of ‘comfort’ shows 
some similarities with Whitney’s ‘tendency to economy’ (Whitney 1875:53 et passim), which also operates on both 
a phonetic and a semantic level (see Nerlich 1990:112-114).
16
sense, can be of temperamental and aesthetic nature:
However, the reason and purpose of the need for clearness is not always related to 
business: it can also be temperamental and aesthetic, and in this case we prefer to speak 
more of expressive, vivid, striking language than clear language. But it is still related to 
essentially the same clearness. The question is only: what is supposed to be indicated, 
what is meant? Clearness is served even by those forms and turns of speech in which 
the speaker manifests his subjectivity or wants to influence the mood of the hearer, 
those particles and phrases that give speech the character of broad temperament, 
considered thought or hefty excitement, the manifestations of modesty and politeness, 
circumlocutions of all kinds, euphemisms and their opposites, which emphasise 
particular properties of things. We might think of the many expressions for ‘to die’, ‘to 
be drunk’, etc. What is clear in this sense is no less the personal and tender than the 
factual and rough.
(Gabelentz 1891:195)25
The strongest parallels between Gabelentz and Whitney can be seen in Whitney’s arguments 
against the division of material and form in language, put forward most explicitly in an 1872 paper, 
‘On material and form in language’, which was incorporated in an abridged, simplified form as 
chapter 11 of The Life and Growth of Language.26 In both texts, Whitney offers an uncompromising 
defence of agglutination theory (Whitney 1872:88; 1875:89-97, 222), and broadens the outer formal
franchise to include syntax as a legitimate but under-appreciated means of formation, citing the 
prototypical example of Chinese (Whitney 1872:81; 1875:221). The indisputable fluidity and 
diversity of form in the world’s languages, argues Whitney, makes it impossible to draw a clear line 
between material and formal linguistic elements:
Nor is there any fixed and definite line to be drawn between the linguistic expression of 
material and that of form. There is rather a shading off from purely formal elements, 
synthetically expressed, through auxiliaries and relational words, into independent 
vocables belonging to parts of speech usually ranked as material. The same word has its 
more material and its more formal meanings and uses. […] Many relations whose 
synthetic expression constitutes an important part of the grammar of one language are in
another left to the mere collocations of the phrase […]
(Whitney 1872:87)
Whitney’s conclusion prefigures Gabelentz’, that any apparent formal use of a linguistic 
expression immediately and necessarily implies the presence of form in a language. Any differences
25 Original: ‘Nicht immer jedoch ist das Deutlichkeitsbedürfniss seinem Grunde und Zwecke nach geschäftlich: es 
kann auch gemüthlich und ästhetisch sein, und dann redet man wohl lieber von ausdrucksvoller, anschaulicher, 
eindringlicher Sprache, als von deutlicher. Und doch ist es im Grunde immer die Deutlichkeit, auf die es dabei 
ankommt. Es fragt sich nur: Was soll angedeutet werden, was wird bedeutet? Auch jene Formen und Wendungen in 
der Rede dienen der Deutlichkeit, in denen der Redende und Phrasen, die der Rede das Gepräge breiter 
Gemüthlichkeit, bedächtiger Überlegung oder heftiger Erregung verleihen, die Äusserungen der Bescheidenheit 
und Höflichkeit, Umschreibungen aller Art, Euphemismen und ihre Gegentheil, die der Sache besondere Merkmale 
abgwennen, – man denke an die vielerlei Ausdrücke für sterben, betrunken sein u.s.w. Deutlich in diesem Sinne ist 
das Persönliche und Zarte nicht minder, als das Sachliche und Derbe.’
26 Whitney (1872) is directed primarily against Friedrich Müller (1871), who offers a particularly succinct and 
correspondingly unsubtle version of contemporary received opinion on material and form.
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are differences of degree only:
[…] there is no real reason, no scientific accuracy, in calling certain languages, as 
distinguished from others, “form-languages,” as if the possession of forms were other 
than universal, or as if a part of human speech possessed “true forms,” while the rest 
had only apparent or ungenuine forms. For, as we have seen, a form in language is 
simply the incorporate expression of an idea which is regarded as subordinate to a class 
of ideas, as they modification or the determinant of their relation ; and wherever that 
end is attained, there is form. And it is attained everywhere, only in varying extent, and 
by discordant means ; it is impossible to conceive of a language not in its absolutely 
incipient stage which should be destitute of form.
(Whitney 1872:92; see also 1875:222)
The consideration of formal means beyond morphology that Whitney advocates provides further 
clues to the development of Gabelentz’ own thoughts on material and form in language. After 
discussing inner form, Gabelentz (1891:327-342) outlines at length some of the outer formal 
diversity exhibited by the world’s languages. In additional passages of Die Sprachwissenschaft not 
in his original 1889 paper, Gabelentz (1891:348-365) then sketches two ‘formal means of the proto-
language’ (Formalmittel der Ursprache; 1891:364), assumed to be present from the beginning of 
human speech and maintained in all existing languages: syntax (Wortstellung) and intonation and 
modulation of the voice (Stimmungsmimik). Under the former heading Gabelentz (1891:348-357) 
provides a summary of his notions of ‘psychological subject and predicate’, essentially topic and 
comment as understood in modern theories of information structure (see Elffers 1991 and Seuren 
1998:120-133 for historical background). Under the latter rubric Gabelentz (1891:357-365) includes
such phenomena as the tone of voice for different sentence types – interrogatives, commands, etc – 
but also expressions of fright, surprise and excitement, as well as onomatopoeia and sound 
symbolism. Morphology – the quintessential means of formation – is derivative of these more 
primitive means: agglutination takes us from syntax to inflection, while sound symbolism is the 
origin of the vowel alternations of the Semitic languages and Indo-European accent (Gabelentz 
1891:334-335, 363-364).
Syntax lies not only at the beginning of Gabelentz’ account of the genesis of formal means, but 
would seem also to have played an important role in the development of his views on material and 
form in language more generally. Syntax was an enduring interest of Gabelentz; his earliest 
academic publications, the 1869 ‘Ideen zu einer vergleichenden Syntax’, and the much longer 1875 
‘Weiteres zur vergleichenden Syntax’, offer a generalising account of syntactic phenomena across a 
range of languages. These articles, through their very subject matter, expand the formal franchise by
elevating syntax to a central place in the formal apparatus of languages. In the 1869 paper this 
remains largely implicit, but it becomes more explicit in 1875: ‘By my thinking, syntax warrants a 
much more importance place in grammar than is normally afforded to it’ ([es] gebührt meines 
Bedünkens der Syntax eine weit wichtigere Stellung in der Grammatik, als die ihr gemeinigtlich 
eingeräumte; Gabelentz 1875:131-132). The increasing emphasis on the truly grammatical nature of
syntactic phenomena no doubt has to do with the principal language that Gabelentz worked with 
professionally, namely Classical Chinese. Of course, Steinthal (1860:115) had also already 
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recognised the syntax of Classical Chinese as one of the properties of that language that made it a 
Formsprache – along with its particles, or ‘empty words’ (see also Ringmacher 1996:162-164) – 
but this did not impinge on his closet admiration of inflection. Gabelentz turned the tables on the 
traditional grammatical hierarchy, putting syntax before all else:
[…] the grammar of an isolating language is syntax alone. Now I grant that many of the 
modern Indo-European grammars stop at that point where syntax should begin. But this 
does not mean that syntax stops being an essential part of the grammar, but rather than 
those books stop being complete grammars. Indeed I believe a complete grammar must 
not only contain a description of syntax, but should in fact start out from the syntax.
(Gabelentz 1884:273)27
In these early writings on comparative syntax we can detect many other features of the aesthetic 
sentiments Gabelentz later articulated more explicitly. In describing the rules governing the 
syntactic structure of German sentences, Gabelentz (1875:138) likens the speaker to an artist, who 
is presented with various rules of his medium, and who makes free use of them to paint the image 
that appears before his mind’s eye. In his discussion of the fixed word order of the modern 
Romance languages, and specifically French, in contrast to the freer word order of Latin, he talks 
about the tension between free expression and the increasing restriction that emerges through habit 
(Gabelentz 1875:159-161).
6. Conclusion
The Formungstrieb of Gabelentz is an aesthetically grounded individual creative drive that is taken 
to constantly repurpose and reformulate existing expressions in language. Linguistic form is nothing
but the accumulated product of this drive. This aesthetic approach was developed chiefly in 
opposition to Steinthal’s psychologistic interpretation of the Humboldtian notion of linguistic form. 
While Gabelentz’ position most certainly represents a unique view on the question of form in 
language, it is not entirely novel. Humboldt and some of his followers, in particular Pott and Hans 
Conon von der Gabelentz, had already laid great emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of language. 
Gabelentz’ main achievement was to allow these considerations to resurface by cutting the 
psychological constraints Steinthal imposed on form. Even Gabelentz’ critique of Steinthal is not 
novel: by mid-century psychologism in linguistics was already under attack from other quarters, and
Gabelentz’ arguments against Steinthal’s psychologism show unmistakable similarities to others 
current at the time, especially those of Whitney.
There is a temptation to draw a link between Gabelentz’ aesthetic conception of language and the
slightly later ‘idealist’ position associated with Karl Vossler (1872–1949; 1904; 1905). Certainly 
there is agreement between Gabelentz and Vossler on key points, such as viewing linguistic 
27 Original ‘[…] die Grammatik einer isolierenden Sprache [ist] lediglich Syntax. Nun hören freilich viele der 
modernen indogermanischen Grammatiken da auf, wo die Syntax anfangen sollte. Aber damit hört die Syntax nicht 
auf, ein wesentlicher Teil der Grammatik zu sein, sondern jene Bücher hören auf, vollständige Grammatiken zu 
sein. In der That glaube ich, eine vollständige Grammatik müsse nicht nur eine Syntax enthalten, sondern sie müsse
geradezu von der Syntax ausgehen.’
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structure the accretion of individual expressive choices, and the resulting emphasis on stylistics as 
the correct point of departure in language study. Both also trace their genealogy back to Humboldt, 
although Vossler comes to Humboldt through the intermediary Benedetto Croce (1866–1952; see 
Vossler 1904:v-vi, 94; cf. Cassirer 1923:119-121; Christmann 1974:11-21; Hall 1963). A key 
difference between Gabelentz and Vossler, however, is the argumentative context in which they 
developed their ideas. Vossler elaborated his idealism in opposition to the ‘positivist’ 
Neogrammarian orthodoxy that dominated contemporary linguistic scholarship. By contrast, 
Gabelentz – although critical of their totalising claims despite their narrow, technical treatment of 
language – did not deny the value of the Neogrammarians’ methods or results (see Gabelentz 
1891:146; cf. Gabelentz 2011[1879]:392). Indeed, there are indications that he tried to emulate their
formal methods as a way of rendering Humboldtian general linguistics a more rigorous enterprise 
(see McElvenny forthcoming:18; Plank 1991:430). Gabelentz is perhaps best considered an 
independent outlier in fin de siècle linguistics, trying to resurrect and maintain an older 
Humboldtianism in a world dominated variously by psychologism and positivism.
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